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NUDGING USERS TOWARDS CROSS-BORDER 
MEDIATION: IS IT REALLY ABOUT 
HARMONISED ENFORCEMENT REGULATION? 
Nadja Alexander 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper Nadja Alexander challenges her audience to think 
in different ways about creating the shift needed to make cross-
border mediation practice a reality rather than rhetoric.  
Within Asia, Hong Kong, Singapore and other centres are 
positioning themselves as regional leaders in cross-border 
mediation. Statistically though, there is not an enormous amount of 
cross-border mediation going on. Despite the apparent advantages 
of mediation and the international regulatory activity outlined above, 
cross-border commercial mediation practice has been slow to 
develop. At dispute resolution conferences and other get-togethers, 
mediators and other ADR advocates ask themselves, “Why”? 
While there is little empirical data to suggest why this is the case, 
numerous writers offer explanations along the following lines. Users 
are said to remain cautious about mediation’s effectiveness in the 
absence of a mature and comprehensive international legal 
framework to regulate the rights and obligations of mediation 
participants such as those relating to the enforceability of MSAs. In 
particular, diversity of enforcement mechanisms for cross-border 
MSAs is seen as a major obstacle to the development of global 
mediation practice. 
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But here is the real question: to what extent will legal and policy 
initiatives to address issues such as confidentiality, competency and 
enforceability change people’s behaviour? For example, would a 
“New York Convention” for mediated settlement agreements 
(currently a popular idea) be enough to motivate parties and lawyers 
to use mediation as their dispute resolution process of choice?   
Insights from behavioural economics and related fields suggest 
that the answer is “maybe” and more likely “no”. Behavioural 
economists postulate that people are not rational actors and will not 
necessarily change behaviour to use cross-border mediation, even if 
their “rational” concerns were to be addressed, for example 
through a “New York Convention” for mediated settlement 
agreements.  
However, the good news is that people — including dispute 
resolution users — are “predictability irrational” (Ariely 2010). 
Therefore there is much that policy makers, dispute resolution 
organisations, mediators and arbitrators can do in terms of 
designing dispute resolution choices (choice architecture) to “nudge” 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009) users in the direction of mediation for 
cross-border matters.  
This paper explores how each and every one of us can apply the 
principles of choice architecture to “nudge” dispute resolution 
users to really make the behavioural shift to cross-border mediation 
practice. 
KEYWORDS: cross-border mediation, opt-out provisions, behavioural 
economics, choice architecture, mediated settlement agreements 
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The story is told of a traveller making his way on a long 
journey across the desert. 
As he plodded on his camel steadily through the dry heat, he 
came upon an oasis. Approaching the desert spring, the traveller 
was surprised to find three brothers weeping profusely. 
Through conversation with the mourning brothers, the 
traveller discovered their father had recently passed away. The 
source of the tears was the brother’s inability to satisfy their 
fathers’ last wish. 
The father had given strict instructions that the inheritance of 
his estate be divided in such a way that the oldest received one 
half, the second received one third, and the youngest received one 
ninth of the father’s estate. 
The brothers had successfully divided the rest of their 
father’s property, but were unable to do so with the camels. The 
father had left them 17 camels, and, try as they may, the brothers 
could not distribute the camels according to father’s wishes. 
The traveler considered the dilemma but confessed that he 
did not know what to do. However, he insisted they receive his 
camel as a gift. After much conversation and many attempts at 
refusal, the brothers relented to the travellers’ demands and 
received the kindness of his gift. 
With 18 camels, the brothers were able to properly divide the 
inheritance and satisfy their father’s wishes. The older brother 
received one half of the herd and took his 9 camels. The second 
brother received one third of the herd and took his 6 camels. The 
youngest brother received one ninth of the herd and took his 2 
camels. 
Surprisingly, 9 camels plus 6 camels plus 2 camels equals 17 
camels. With the inheritance properly distributed, the traveller 
was able to take his camel and continue on his journey.1 
This timeless story has travelled through centuries, capturing the 
imagination and curiosity of many. What does the story mean? What does 
the 18th camel symbolise? 
For mediators and other conflict interveners, the 18th camel may 
represent our ability to think creatively and search for solutions outside the 
box. The story invites us to stretch our thinking to encompass fresh insights 
in dispute resolution conversations. Similarly, this paper invites all of us 
                                                        
1 Eric von Atzigen, The Story of the 18th Camel, MONDAY MORNING REVIEW (July 12, 2010), 
http://mondaymorningreview.wordpress.com/2010/07/12/the-story-of-the-18th-camel/. Adapted 
from MALBA TAHAN, THE MAN WHO COUNTED: A COLLECTION OF MATHEMATICAL ADVENTURES 
(Leslie Clark & Alastair Reid trans.) (1938).  
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involved in cross-border dispute resolution to ask challenging questions 
about the field and open our minds to new ideas to grow it. There might not 
be answers, at least not yet. There are, however, excellent questions. As the 
Austrian poet, Rilke, mused, “Have patience with everything that remains 
unsolved in your heart. Try to love the questions themselves . . . Do not now 
look for the answers . . . At present you need to live the question.” 2 
Let us begin then with asking and ‘living’ three seemingly unrelated 
questions.  
1. How do you get people to eat more fruit and less junk food? 
2. How do you get more people to agree to donate their organs?  
3. How do you get more people to engage in cross-border mediation? 
We will return subsequently to food and organs. Let us dwell, for a 
moment, on mediation. 
Within Asia, Hong Kong, Singapore and other centres are positioning 
themselves as regional leaders in cross-border mediation. Statistically 
though, there is not an enormous amount of cross-border mediation going on. 
Despite the apparent advantages of mediation and the international 
regulatory activity outlined above, cross-border commercial mediation 
practice has been slow to develop. For example, a 2010 survey of European 
Union (EU) corporations and lawyers indicates that 75% of mediations in 
relation to filed cases are successful and result in dispute resolution costs 
savings. However, only 0.5% of filed cases go to mediation, despite the fact 
that the costs of disputing consume an appreciable portion of these 
corporations’ budgets. 3  International arbitration remains the process of 
choice.4 At dispute resolution conferences and other get-togethers, mediators 
and other ADR advocates ask themselves, “Why”? 
While there is little empirical data to suggest why this is the case, 
numerous writers offer explanations along the following lines. Users are said 
to remain cautious about mediation’s effectiveness in the absence of a mature 
and comprehensive international legal framework to regulate the rights and 
obligations of mediation participants such as those relating to the 
enforceability of MSAs. In particular, diversity of enforcement mechanisms 
                                                        
2 RAINER MARIA RILKE, LETTERS TO A YOUNG POET (2011).  
3 See GIUSEPPE DE PALO ET AL., ‘REBOOTING’ THE MEDIATION DIRECTIVE: ASSESSING THE LIMITED 
IMPACT OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND PROPOSING MEASURES TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF 
MEDIATIONS IN THE EU (2010). In relation to domestic mediation practice see the following two 
studies: On the varied but increasing use of domestic mediation by inhouse corporate counsel in the 
United States, see Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions 
and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2013); on the use of domestic mediation by inhouse corporate counsel in 
France, see FIDAL-AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION/ICDR, DISPUTE-WISE BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT: BEST CORPORATE PRACTICES IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FROM FRANCE (June 
2013). 
4  See Gerry Lagerberg & Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and 
Practices (2008), http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf. 
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for cross-border MSAs is seen as a major obstacle to the development of 
global mediation practice.5 
Some commentators suggest that mediation needs its own New York 
Convention (as international commercial arbitration has). 6  Others 
recommend the increased use of hybrid processes such as arb-med-arb. Here 
mediated settlements take the form of an arbitral consent award, so that 
arguably the New York Convention would apply thus alleviating 
enforcement concerns.7 
Yet others talk about the quality of mediators and the need for a large 
and reliable international pool of professional mediators before cross-border 
mediation becomes as ubiquitous as cross-border arbitration.  
Of course, it might be useful to ask users of mediation what they need 
and what would make mediation more attractive to them. There are 
numerous international user surveys available, many of which are 
summarised in the recently released Singapore International Commercial 
Mediation Report.8 To a large extent the user surveys reinforce the previous 
suggestions — that enforceability of mediated settlements, robust 
confidentiality protection, and a pool of competent mediators are important 
to users. Users also indicated that mediation should be actively promoted by 
arbitration institutes.9 
But here is the real question: to what extent will legal and policy 
initiatives to address issues such as confidentiality, competency and 
enforceability change people’s behaviour? While it is true that there is no 
                                                        
5  See Chang-Fa Lo, Desirability of A New International Legal Framework For Cross-Border 
Enforcement Of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements, 7(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 119, 121 
(2014); Bobette Wolski, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical Questions And 
Directions For Future Research, 7(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 87, 89 (2014); Edna Sussman, The 
New York Convention through a Mediation Prism, 15 No. 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 11 (2009); Geoff 
Sharp, The Handbrake on Global Mediation present at AMA Conference (Hong Kong, 2014). 
6 New York Convention refers to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958. In a survey conducted by Bühring-Uhle regarding the perceived 
advantages of arbitration for continental European and US lawyers, the existence of an enforcement 
mechanism was praised and rated as one of arbitration’s strong advantages: CHRISTIAN BÜ HRING-
UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, 108-09 (2d ed. 2006); 
Christian Bühring-Uhle et al., The Arbitrator as Mediator: Some Recent Empirical Insights, 20 J. 
INT’L ARB. 81-88 (2003). See also Lagerberg & Mistelis, supra note 4. 
7 See Sussman, supra note 5; Bobette Wolski, Arb-Med-Arb (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less 
Than, Not Greater Than, The Sum Of Its Parts?, 6(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 249 (2013). On the 
institutional plans for arb-med-arb in Singapore, see SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF LAW, COMMERCIAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES IN SINGAPORE SET TO GROW (2013). 
8 See SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF LAW, supra note 7. 
9  See the following user surveys: Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 3 ; FIDAL-AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION/ICDR, supra note 3; INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, IMI 
ADR USERS SURVEY MARCH 24, 2013 (2013), 
https://imimediation.org/cache/downloads/5pm4uddkuacc0sw40cck0cscs/IMI%20ADR%20Users
%20Survey%20March%2024,%202013%20-%20full%20results.pdf (This was an analysis of 
interviews conducted with French corporate in-house counsel regarding their attitudes to dispute 
management and ADR.); SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF LAW, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 12, 15. 
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“New York Convention for mediation” as yet, hybrid dispute resolution 
processes offering access to potential benefits of the New York Convention 
for such as med-arb and arb-med-arb have long existed in many parts of the 
world. While it is fair to say that that an international mediation profession 
is in its early stages, there are many excellent international mediators with 
thriving practices. In many countries, confidentiality is increasingly 
regulated in a uniform way by national statutes, thereby offering legal 
certainty about the scope of confidentiality and related matters in mediation. 
As trite as it may seem, there is one significant factor that the users in 
these surveys share — they are human beings. Behavioural scientists have 
demonstrated that human beings are not the rational actors that traditional 
economics would have us believe; human beings are not homo economicus.10 
As human beings we don’t always mean what we say, and, no matter how 
optimistic and confident we are, we don’t always do what we say we will do. 
Human beings do not always make decisions to maximise a calculable gain, 
whether they are choosing a car or a cross-border dispute resolution process.  
Therefore, while (potential) mediation users may indicate that the 
mediation process would be more attractive for them with an international 
enforceability regime in place, this attitude does not necessarily translate to 
usage of cross-border mediation even if the desired regulatory measures are 
in place. This is not to say that regulatory measures are not desirable and 
useful. There are many reasons why a “New York convention for mediation” 
would be highly desirable and these have been canvassed by others.11 The 
focus of this paper, however, is on how to encourage the use of mediation by 
cross-border disputants. 
Smits highlights some insights from behavioural psychology that are 
useful for exploring the effectiveness of harmonisation initiatives in relation 
to laws on the enforceability of cross-border MSAs.12 The first is the status 
quo principle, which states that parties are likely to stay with the status quo, 
that is, with norms with which they are familiar, rather than with new 
provisions that are unfamiliar, even if these provisions maximise benefits to 
them. Moreover, where it is difficult to calculate the costs and benefits of a 
new alternative, parties tend to simplify their thinking and behave in a risk 
averse manner, generally staying with the dispute resolution pathways they 
usually use.  
Thus, rather than to opt for a new harmonised or uniform system, parties 
are more likely to choose: 
                                                        
10  See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law And Behavioral Science: Removing The 
Rationality Assumption From Law And Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.1051 (2000); BEHAVIOURAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-5, 137-39 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY 
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (1st ed., 2008). 
11 See supra note 5. 
12 JAN SMITS, MAASTRICHT FACULTY OF LAW WORKING PAPER 2005/9, at 24 (2005). 
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1. existing mediation or arbitration rules; and 
2. a legal system with which they are familiar. 
In the absence of familiar mediation rules and past cases to aid decision-
making parties, the aversion to newness and change suggests that parties may 
be reluctant to engage in cross-border mediation at all. In this context, Thaler 
and Sunstein make the following observation: “It is particularly hard for 
people to make good decisions when they have trouble translating the 
choices they make into the experiences they will have.”13 Empirical research 
cited previously on the low use of inter-European mediation further supports 
this view;14 it indicates that a lack of awareness about the law of mediation 
generally and an absence of corporate alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
policies negatively affect parties’ decisions to engage in mediation with 
foreign partners. Where parties are familiar with arbitration, the status quo 
principle suggests they would rather continue with arbitration even if it might 
not be the rationally better choice for them. 
Furthermore, parties are not only likely to be risk averse as described 
above; behavioural psychology suggests that they are likely to be loss averse 
and will do even more to avoid loss than to make a gain. For this reason 
contracting parties may be unwilling to spend the money (and take a certain 
cost loss) to obtain legal advice on how to draft their contract to include new 
provisions relating to mediation or to inform themselves about the applicable 
mediation provisions and instead prefer to wait until a dispute arises.  
Accordingly, self-reported user data from surveys and interviews may 
not be as reliable a predictor of what will change cross-border disputant 
behaviour as hoped. As indicated previously, while a harmonised 
enforceability regime for cross-border MSAs might be desirable for a host 
of well-examined reasons,15 behavioural sciences research suggests that it 
will not overcome disputants’ risk and loss aversion tendencies. These 
findings might go some way to explain the extremely low usage of mediation 
in the European Union, despite existing data demonstrating mediation’s 
significant quantifiable benefits.16 
While this may seem like a heavy cloud of doom over the future of cross-
border mediation, there is a silver lining. Although human beings may be 
irrational, we are, in Dan Ariely’s famous words, “predictably irrational”.17 
In other words, there are patterns to our non-rational behaviour. Where there 
are patterns of behaviour, there are corresponding opportunities to influence 
                                                        
13 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (2009). 
14 See GIUSEPPE DE PALO ET AL., supra note 3. 
15 See supra note 5. 
16 See GIUSEPPE DE PALO ET AL., supra note 3. 
17 ARIELY, supra note 10. 
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them. This is where the concept and principles of “choice architecture” 
become relevant.18  
Choice architecture draws upon two ideas. The first idea is that people 
like to have choice as it provides a feeling being in control. The second idea 
is that when we offer others a choice, we frame that choice, and in doing so, 
influence the ultimate outcome. The corollary of this second principle is that 
by offering choice we cannot not influence others’ choices.  
If we accept that influence is inevitable, choice architecture suggests we 
can and should usefully and ethically influence others’ choices with 
intentional design rather than leaving it to unintentional and uninformed 
design. In this way we become choice architects: governments, mediation 
service providers, mediation accreditation institutes, mediators, mediation 
advocates, academics — all of us.  
Researchers Thaler and Sunstein refer to this type of influence as 
“nudging”.19 Nudge and it is the title of their best-selling book, the principles 
of which have been applied by the UK and other national governments in 
policymaking contexts. Following the argumentation of the authors, 
“nudging” disputants towards cross-border mediation would not involve 
using rational arguments to persuade people (e.g. offering mediation 
information sessions that explain why mediation is good for you), coercion 
(e.g. using financial or other sanctions to ensure participation in mediation) 
or bans (e.g. no litigating or arbitrating until you have mediated). 
Scientists have demonstrated through different research methods that 
humans are prepared to reject perceived unfairness even at substantial cost. 
This is based in our biology: a decade of studies using brain imaging shows 
that human neural activity, particularly in the insula cortex region, is actived 
when we perceive unfairness in social interactions.20 So, for example, our 
brains might be triggered for perceived unfairness when someone is making 
decisions for us, telling us what to do (e.g. mandating mediation) or telling 
us what not to do (e.g. don’t litigate) or when financial sanctions are imposed 
when we would prefer not to mediate.  
Let us take an example from Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, Practice 
Direction (PD) 31 requires parties to mediate before trial in cases where it is 
reasonable to do so. With a pro-mediation judiciary, that means in virtually 
all cases. Most lawyers encourage their clients positively to comply with the 
requirement. However, it is known that a minority of lawyers resist PD 31. 
They pay lip service to the requirement, treat it as an unwanted step towards 
litigation, and participate in deliberately short mediations with no intention 
                                                        
18 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 12. 
19 See id. 
20 Nicholas Wright & Karim Sadjadpour, The Neuroscience Guide to Negotiations With Iran, THE 
ATLANTIC NEWSPAPER (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2014/01/the-neuroscience-guide-to-negotiations-with-iran/282963/. 
2014] NUDGING USERS TOWARDS CROSS-BORDER MEDIATION: IS IT REALLY 
ABOUT HARMONISED ENFORCEMENT REGULATION? 
413 
 
 
of settling. Despite the fact that these lawyers remains a minority, their 
activity negatively impacts on the development of mediation by giving users 
poor experiences. 
Let us now return to the three questions at the start of this paper. 
How do you get people to eat more fruit and less junk food? Thaler and 
Sunstein report on research showing that the simple action of putting fruit on 
shelves at eye level in a cafeteria increased fruit consumption by 25%. 
Moving junk food away from the shelves at eye level has been shown to 
decrease consumption of junk food by 25%.21 Here the choice architecture 
of the cafeteria environment influences or ‘nudges’ a significant number of 
people to change their food preference.  
How do you get more people to agree to donate their organs? This 
research highlights the power of human inertia and how much we dislike 
ticking forms. 22  In Germany the relevant form at the Department of 
Transport asks people to tick a box if they wish to be an organ donor. 12% 
of people tick the box. Just over the border, in Austria, the same form asks 
people to tick the box if they do not want to donate. Here only 1% of people 
tick the box. So 99% of people agree to be organ donors. This is a powerful 
statistic that demonstrates the consequences of mindless choice architecture 
and establishes the principle that we cannot not influence when we offer 
others a choice. 
So, how can we use the principles of choice architecture to encourage 
disputants to engage in cross-border mediation? Here are two simple ideas 
to get the conversation going. 
A. Opt-Out Provisions 
As we have seen, inertia is a strong force. People like the path of least 
resistance. So opt-out mediation provisions are going to be much more 
effective that opt-in provisions. Opt-out provisions give people as much 
choice as opt-in provisions; they just don’t require people to actively “tick 
the box”. We saw this principle in action in the United States in the 1990s, 
where court programmes allowing lawyers to opt-out of ADR saw 80% of 
lawyers stay with ADR. Where court programmes had opt-in provisions, 
hardly anyone opted for ADR (less than 20%).23   
Today in cross-border dispute resolution, most arbitration rules make 
provision for mediation windows to be opened during the arbitration 
procedure. The majority of these, however, are opt-in rules, i.e. they permit 
                                                        
21 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 1-12. 
22 ARIELY, supra note 10, at 184-192. 
23 See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: an Empirical Analysis, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 1487  (1994). 
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parties to elect to incorporate mediation. Not surprisingly, the uptake has 
been underwhelming. 
In the words of Lord Woolf, 
Remarkably, while I would have expected mediation to have a 
more prominent role in arbitration than in other areas of litigation, 
in fact from my unscientific observation the opposite is true . . . . 
I have over the years found among the arbitration industry a 
remarkable reluctance about promoting mediation. I find the 
reasons advanced for this worryingly unsatisfactory. If this is due 
in any way to supposed self-interest, this is a mistake. Parties to 
commercial arbitration, as in litigation, are increasingly 
jaundiced as to the rising costs. If increased use of mediation 
reduces the average cost of arbitration, this would increase its 
popularity.24 
An exception to this trend is offered by the American Arbitration 
Association’s (AAA) new Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation 
Procedures, which make mediation a process step that the parties need to 
opt-out of, rather than a choice they would have to opt into. New Rule 9 
provides: 
In all cases where a claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, upon 
the AAA’s administration of the arbitration or at any time while 
the arbitration is pending, the parties shall mediate their dispute 
pursuant to the applicable provisions of the AAA’s Commercial 
Mediation Procedures, or as otherwise agreed by the parties. 
Absent an agreement of the parties to the contrary, the mediation 
shall take place concurrently with the arbitration and shall not 
serve to delay the arbitration proceedings. However, any party to 
an arbitration may unilaterally opt out of this rule upon 
notification to the AAA and the other parties to the arbitration. 
The parties shall confirm the completion of any mediation or any 
decision to opt out of this rule to the AAA. Unless agreed to by 
all parties and the mediator, the mediator shall not be appointed 
as an arbitrator to the case. 
Rule 9 seems to be consistent with research indicating that users desire 
arbitration providers to “actively encourage” the use of “mediation to settle 
                                                        
24  Lord Woolf, Annual Mediation Lecture present at the Singapore Management University: 
Mediation: The Way Forward (Oct. 10, 2013).  
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their dispute.” 25 Reflecting on this research, Michael Leathes comments that 
what most users want is “something between mediation being a mandatory 
step and active encouragement to mediate”.26 Thaler and Sunstein would say 
that users want to be nudged. As Leathes explains, AAA’s nudge is to replace 
the implicit opt-in with an express opt-out.  
There is another feature of the AAA’s opt-out provision that lends it 
extra “nudge” quality, namely its use of the status quo principle outlined 
previously. As arbitration represents the status quo for cross-border dispute 
resolution and users are familiar with arbitration, the AAA provision 
effectively pick users up where they are comfortable. It is within the familiar 
terrain of arbitration procedures that the new mediation opt-out is found.  
Could this be the beginning of an international trend? It is hard to find 
an argument not to include the mediation clause, especially if users have the 
power to opt out. 
B. Make It Easy — Do Away With the ADR Menu 
Apart from being stricken by inertia, human beings are overwhelmed by 
choice. Too much choice will lead to procrastination and inaction. Being user 
friendly does not necessarily mean offering clients the whole ADR menu and 
asking them to select a process.  
As soon as human beings have to choose among three things with more 
than one criterion to compare them, we tend to get lost. Ariely reminds us of 
the well-known advertisement in The Economist magazine.27 For an annual 
subscription to The Economist, you could choose from: 
1. The Economist.com online subscription for $59.00; 
2. The Economist print subscription for $125.00; 
3. The Economist print and web subscription for $125.00. 
With these choices, most readers selected option 3. They compared it to 
option 2 (to which option 3 is certainly superior) and no readers selected 
option 2; very few selected option 1. These choices were replicated in various 
experiments with the same results. It would appear therefore that option 2 is 
a choice that no one wants to have. In subsequent experiments option 2 was 
removed and people were left to choose between options 1 and 3. Here 
                                                        
25 As reported in Michael Leathes, The Dispute Resolution Dilemma: Opt-In or Opt-Out?, KLUWER 
MEDIATION BLOG (May 18, 2014), http://kluwermediationblog.com/2014/05/18/the-dispute-
resolution-dilemma-opt-in-or-opt-out/: The International Mediation Institute, the Corporate Counsel 
International Arbitration Group and the Conflict Management Round Table of German Business 
surveyed in-house dispute resolution counsel, General Counsel and some senior management in over 
70 multinational corporations. One of the propositions put to those surveyed was: “Parties to an 
arbitration proceeding should be actively encouraged by the Arbitration Provider to use mediation 
to settle their dispute.” A total of 74% of responders agreed with this statement, 22% were ambivalent 
and only 4% disagreed. 
26 Id. 
27 See ARIELY, supra note 10. 
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something surprising occurred. Significantly more people chose option 1 
when there were only two options compared to when there were three options 
from which to choose. The existence of a third option (in this case option 2) 
which no one seemed to want, directly influenced choice as between the 
other two options (options 1 and 3). This is choice architecture in action. 
Might it be possible for dispute resolution services providers to apply 
these principles to encourage the use of mediation in cross-border disputes? 
Consider, for example, the following dispute resolution fee schedule: 
1. Arbitration: $10,000 per arbitrator per day; 
2. Mediation: $10,000 per mediator per day; 
3. Arbitration and mediation: $10,000 per mediator/arbitrator per day. 
Certainly, this suggestion needs some refinement. But let us start 
thinking about how to use the science of human decision-making to help 
people manage complex choices around dispute resolution.  
CONCLUSION 
Enforceability of cross-border MSAs continues to be a real issue to be 
addressed. However a regulatory regime for the recognition and 
enforceability of cross-border MSAs is unlikely to change user behaviour on 
its own. It needs to be supplemented with some serious nudging through 
choice architecture. Behavioural science offers cross-disciplinary insights 
that can harness human inertia and choice dilemmas to nudge lawyers and 
parties into using cross-border mediation more frequently. The principles of 
choice architecture can be applied in the shaping of government and 
institutional mediation policies and incentives to nudge cross-border 
mediation usage in a positive direction.  
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